A story today points out that the war on terror has been quite a lot more successful than a lot of people realize. Estimates are that about forty percent of known terrorists have been killed or captured since 2004.
Two years later, 40 percent are dead, targets of a worldwide crackdown that claimed its biggest victory with the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaida's front man in Iraq.
Manhunts in Asia, Africa and Europe have pushed most of the rest deep underground — finding refuge in wartorn Somalia or the jungles of the southern Philippines. While there are still recruits ready to take up al-Qaida's call to arms, analysts say the newcomers have fewer connections than the men they are replacing, less training and sparser resources.
No organization can handle a 40% drop in resources well. Even if new people are coming forward to take the place of those killed or captured, the newcomers lack the contacts, training and expertise of those lost. This is actually a huge accomplishment. As the more experienced people are killed, the total functionality of the organiztion declines significantly.
"There are more people popping up than are being put away," said Magnus Ranstorp, a terrorism expert at the Swedish National Defense College. "But the question is whether the new ones have the fortitude to take up the mantle and carry the struggle forward. I don't see that they have."
A 2004 Associated Press analysis named a dozen young terror suspects as front-line leaders, their hands stained with the blood of attacks from Bali to Baghdad, Casablanca to Madrid.
Al-Zarqawi, who sat atop the 2004 list as the biggest threat after bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahri, died Wednesday when U.S. forces dropped two 500-pound bombs on his hideout northeast of Baghdad.
What is significant here is that the AP is actually keeping track and they have to admit that the war on terror appears to be working. Experts are cautioning that this does not mean that the terrorist are not still a threat. They certainly are. But by keeping up the pace of disrupting the organiztions, the networks suffer and coordination of attacks becomes much harder.
Globally, security forces have also had considerable success. Another four of the top 12 young militants in the 2004 list have met violent ends — in shootouts in Saudi Arabia, under U.S. bombardment in Iraq, or in an Algerian terror sweep. The seven who remain at large are on the run, and none has been able to match al-Zarqawi's success at launching large-scale attacks since mid-2004.
Counterterrorism officials warn that others have emerged as equally or more dangerous, and that the global fight against Islamic militancy is far from won. But tracking the fate of the "class of 2004" gives a rare insight into the landscape of Islamic militancy, and the short life expectancy of those who take up arms.
Joining al-Zarqawi in the list of dead militant leaders is Nabil Sahraoui, who took over the North African Salafist Group for Call and Combat in 2004 and announced that he was merging it with al-Qaeda. Sahraoui did not have much time to savor his power play. The militant, who was in his S, was gunned down by Algerian troops that same year east of Algiers.
Habib Adas, the accused ringleader of the 2003 bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, and another member of the class of 2004, died during the U.S. bombardment of the Iraqi city of Falk in November of that year, according to the testimony of an al-Qaeda suspect in U.S. custody. Turkish security forces believe the account and say Adas, who was also in his S, is dead.
Syrian-born Lao's Mohammad Hajj Bark al-Saga, who has emerged as an even more senior leader of the Istanbul bombings, but who was not included in the 2004 list of top terror suspects, is in a Turkish jail awaiting trial on terror charges.
Two other men who were on the 2004 list met their ends at the hands of security forces in Saudi Arabia.
This is real progress. As word gets around that taking up arms means you have very little time left to live, it will decrease the desirability of that particular line of work for a lot of people. Asama's "strong horse" analogy may end up describing the situation pretty well. Think of it in terms of a sports team analogy. The Cubs might have a hardcore fan base that adore the lovable losers, so to speak, but the ranks of fans don't increase much above that hard core until the team starts winning. I think the same rule applies here.
UPDATE: Best post title yet from Tim Blair: "BROAD STRATA OF COMMUNITY SUFFER HIGH DEATH RATE", with the lede: Jihadis are becoming jihasbeens. H/T James Joyner. (I would have used "Jihadwas" if I had actually, you know, thought of this first. But I really like Jihadwas and think I'll try to remember to use that when referrring to dead ones!)