What Will Happen
There are a lot of differing opinions on how the whole situation in Lebanon will turn out. There are many negative opinions, many positive and/or hopeful ones. I thin Ha'aretz has published an interview that helps clarify the underlying issues and helps define what must be accomplished. A return to the status quo ante is not in anyone's best interests, not the Israelis, not the Lebanese and not the Palestinians.
Professor Martin Kramer says that he does not know, and therefore he cannot answer, whether the war will rip apart the delicate fabric of Lebanese society. But, he says, "I expect that it will shatter the fragile fiction of Lebanese politics."
A world-renowned expert on Lebanon, Kramer is a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a former director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Why do you think this crisis is happening?
"Hezbollah's hubris has created an opportunity for Israel.
"Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah has basked in the illusion that it defeated Israel - that it somehow discovered a path to victory that had eluded Arab governments and the Palestinian movement. It began to puff itself up, as the only force willing and able to stand up to Israel. Hezbollah lost its respect for Israeli power, and began to portray Israel as unable to sustain a protracted conflict.
"Nasrallah allowed a personality cult to develop around himself, and Hezbollah marketed him as the only strategic genius in the Arab world. Increasingly, it would seem that the higher echelons in Hezbollah began to believe their own propaganda.
"I doubt Hezbollah expected the Israeli reaction to be as swift, extensive and destructive as it has been. Hezbollah probably believed it would score a few points in Arab public opinion by a cross-border operation, and that it would make one more incremental change in the rules of the game.
"It was a strategic miscalculation. Hezbollah didn't internalize changes in the broader strategic climate. The top regional issue today is Iran's nuclear drive, not the fate of Hamas or the Palestinian issue. If Hezbollah had understood this fully, it would have laid very low until needed by Iran in a mega-crisis with the United States. At that point, its threats against Israel would have been added to the overall deterrent capabilities of Iran, and might have caused the United States to think twice.
"Hezbollah apparently didn't understand this. If Iran was directly involved in the decision, it also shows an erosion of discipline in Iran's own decision-making process. Iran had nothing to gain from this little adventure, and a lot to lose. It may well be that President Ahmadinejad's rhetoric is beginning to cloud judgment in Tehran.
"In any case, it is in the interests of Israel and the United States to deal with the Hezbollah threat now, and not later in the midst of a far more dangerous crisis over Iran's nuclear plans. So a war now to degrade Hezbollah is a shared Israel-U.S. interest, which means that Israel can wage it without many constraints.
Read the whole thing. It's worth taking the time to read. The is an enormous opportunity here, but also an enormous risk.





