Deterrence
During the Cold War the United States and Russia managed to refrain from launching nuclear weapons at each other no matter how tense things got between the two superpowers. This was accomplished mainly by one, simple if awful doctrine. Known as Mutually Assured Destruction, or the completely appropriate acronym MAD, both sides understood that any nuclear attack by one power would be met with an overwhelming response by the one attacked. It was a terribly cold calculus, but it kept the missiles in their silos. It worked for one, simple reason: both side were fundamentally sane. Both sides knew that both sides would be destroyed and that there would be no winner of such a war.
But it counted on both sides being sane.
Dan Senor looks at Iran's behavior and does not see that sanity. In 1992 and again in 1994 Hezbollah, financed and directed directly by Iran detonated powerful bombs in Argentina. A prosecutor their has issued arrest warrants for top Iranian leaders. (I posted about that here.) Apparently the attacks were carried out to teach Argentina a lesson after they stopped cooperating with Iran on nuclear energy and missile programs. It was also a demonstration to Israel that Iran could reach out anywhere. Senor draws a number of conclusions from these events:
The Argentinean case reminds us of four important points.
First, we must reconsider the applicability of Cold War-style deterrence. Its central argument is this: While it would be preferable that Iran not go nuclear, the history of the Cold War demonstrates that the possession of nukes creates a balance of power, and thus makes the possibility of nuclear war extremely unlikely. Representing the pro-deterrence school, Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations says, "We've lived with Iran as a terror threat for a generation. Iran has a return address, and states with a return address can be retaliated against."
This misses the point. Even if Iran never fires a nuke or transfers one to a terrorist group, its possession of nukes would enable it to escalate support for terrorist proxies, allowing it to dominate the region and threaten moderate regimes. Who would be prepared to retaliate against a future Buenos Aires terror attack if we knew that the "return address" was home to a nuclear weapon?
Second, U.S. officials are deeply concerned that Tehran would not even have to build a complete bomb to transform the balance of power. It would just have to make the case that it could complete development on short notice. "For their political needs, that would be enough," says Gary Samore, a nonproliferation official in the Clinton administration.
Third, Mr. Rafasanjani continues to be described in the Western media as a leading Iranian "moderate." If Mr. Toma is correct, this "moderate" was intimately involved in the planning of the Argentina bombings. And he has ambitions to succeed President Ahmadinejad.
Fourth, according to Mr. Toma, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei authorized the Buenos Aires attacks. This is important because many analysts today argue that, as scary as President Ahmadinejad sounds, he is not really in charge in Tehran–the true "decider" is the Supreme Leader. Well if he is, then we should in fact be doubly concerned.
Therein lies the real problem with Iran. The actions they took against Argentina are not fundamentally sane. Governments that are sane do not plant bombs to murder civilians as a payback for another government's decision not to pursue certain arms deals. That is why deterrence will not work with Iran.
Strange as it sounds, a MAD doctrine will not work if one of the parties is really quite mad.
By Bleepless, September 29, 2007 @ 11:54 am
Gaius, things may be even worse than that. A babbling loonie may end up not being able to find, or care about, the button because he is too busy raising giraffes in his shoes. An ideologue, however fanatical, has a certain internal consistency. The apocalyptic aspect of Islam mandates widespread destruction throughout the world before the Mahdi establishes universal Muslim rule. Nobody — but nobody — has asked A’jad whether or not he is the Mahdi, knows who the Mahdi is, or sees himself as a tool of the Mahdi in bringing destruction/Islamic rule.
Perhaps someone should.
By Quilly Mammoth, September 29, 2007 @ 2:51 pm
Shortly after 9-11 occurred there was a heavy and often emotional debate amongst some very intelligent people on Baen’s Bar. One side that developed was the “Option Zero” group. Based on people’s actual life experiences in Tehran and elsewhere this group feels that is almost a certainty that Al Qaeda and/or the Iranian Islamic Revolution will some day force the West to eventually glassify the middle east…precisely because of the sanity factor you mention.
The only other option is to restore sanity to that area and that can _only_ be done through democritization.
I’m not sure about the glassification part as being inevitable. But the argument was strong enough, combined with the realization that disengagement from being a force in international affairs would not stop AQ, that it changed my position on US military involvement overseas. I once, after the Evil Empire fell, agreed with people like Ron Paul. I now agree with the “neo-cons”.
If the nations in the ME do not become democracies we will be fighting them a long time…and they, indeed, just may push us into Option Zero.